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THE EUROPEAN COMPETITION NETWORK AND THE 
SHAPING OF EU COMPETITION POLICY
Mislav Mataija* 
Summary: This paper assesses the functioning of the European Com-
petition Network (ECN) introduced by the EC’s modernisation package 
of 2004 to replace the European Commission’s enforcement monopoly 
in the field of competition law. By all accounts, and contrary to the fe-
ars of early critics, the modernisation of EC competition policy and the 
decentralisation of its enforcement have not led to disintegration wit-
hin the network of competition regulators. The institutional differences 
between national competition authorities (NCAs) have so far not had a 
negative impact. The ECN is fuelled by the nature of the increasingly 
technocratic and expert-driven discipline of competition law, as well 
as by the Commission’s conscious strategy of ‘soft’ centralisation. The 
new system is also reinforcing a specific perspective on competition 
law, focused on market efficiency, and viewed as an autonomous dis-
cipline divorced from outside pressures and influence by the Member 
States. Even though such a conclusion seems counterintuitive, overall 
the ECN has had, and is likely to have, a unifying effect both in enfor-
cement and in policy formation. There are, however, pressures in the 
opposite direction, which might become stronger as the NCAs’ expe-
rience grows and horizontal communication increases in frequency.
1. The European Competition Network – central issues
Competition has long been regarded as one of the most important 
and centralised areas of European Community policy. Competition rules, 
most prominently today’s arts 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union, have given EU institutions a clear en-
forcement mandate. To be sure, there has been plenty of disagreement 
on what purpose the rules should serve, and ideas on the proper role of 
competition policy have changed dramatically over time.1 Nevertheless, 
competition policy continues to hold a position of prominence among 
Community activities.
1 See eg David J Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization (OUP, Oxford 
2010) 183-202.
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Thus, it is easy to see why so much academic and professional atten-
tion has been devoted to the modernisation of EC competition policy, 
formally taking place in 2004 with the coming into force of Regulation 
1/2003,2 described by a leading competition law expert as a ‘cultural and 
legal revolution’.3 This paper will focus on a key element of that reform – 
the formation of the European Competition Network (ECN), consisting of 
the European Commission as Europe’s leading competition enforcer, and 
the Member States’ national competition authorities (NCAs).4 In particu-
lar, the aim will be to assess the network’s effectiveness and its possible 
influence on the development of competition policy in the EU and the 
Member States, as well as to address some challenges posed by informal, 
not fully transparent network-style regulation. The paper is limited to the 
areas covered by Regulation 1/2003, ie to antitrust issues falling under 
arts 101 and 102 TFEU. The impact of modernisation on mergers and 
state aid regulation is not addressed,5 except tangentially.
As a whole, modernisation introduced two sweeping changes. The 
first one is a new system of enforcement, in which companies no longer 
have to pre-emptively notify their agreements for review by the Commi-
ssion, but will be subject to legal action only ex officio or upon complaint. 
The second is the formal decentralisation of enforcement, from the Com-
mission to the NCAs. This seemingly curious case of an agent (the Com-
mission) ceding the enforcement monopoly granted to it by the principals 
(the Member States) back to the Member States’ own regulatory entities 
has captured the attention of several political scientists.6
The ECN’s basic purpose is to facilitate the enforcement of Commu-
nity competition law. As Regulation 1/2003 provides, the NCAs become 
primary enforcers of EC competition rules, alongside the Commission. 
Either the Commission or any NCA can begin an investigation into an 
alleged breach of EC competition rules. Without ironclad rules on the 
2 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1.
3 Claus Dieter Ehlermann, ‘The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural 
Revolution’ (2000) 37 CML Rev 537.
4 Some NCAs have not joined the Network. An example is the UK Competition Commission 
(the UK is represented in the ECN by the Office of Fair Trading, with which it shares com-
petence in this area).
5 For an account of merger regulation, see Lee McGowan & Michele Cini, ‘Discretion and 
Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control’ (1999) 12 Governance 
175.
6 See Stephen Wilks, ‘Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European 
Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?’ (2005) 18 Governance 431; Gian-
domenico Majone, ‘Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EC’ (2001) 
2 (1) European Union Politics 103; Dirk Lehmkuhl, ‘On Government, Governance and Ju-
dicial Review: The Case of European Competition Policy’ (2008) 28 Journal of Public Policy 
139; Adrienne Héritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl, ‘Introduction: The Shadow of Hierarchy and New 
Modes of Governance’ (2008) 28 Journal of Public Policy 1.
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division of jurisdiction or policy competence, the ECN becomes necessary 
as a co-ordination mechanism in a system of dispersed regulatory aut-
hority. 
The rules of co-ordination and co-operation, insofar as they are for-
malised at all, are contained in a Commission Notice,7 a non-binding 
instrument accepted voluntarily by the Member States. Nevertheless, 
the ECN does not fit the mould of a classic informal network, in which 
the relationships between actors develop organically through time-ho-
noured practices.8 Rather, there are explicit rules reserving authority for 
the Commission, which not only has to be notified of all individual cases 
but can ‘pluck’ any case from an NCA, at discretion. Thus, it has been 
argued that the ECN is not a typical, but a ‘managed’ network, in which 
the relationship between the ‘nodes’ (NCAs) is not nearly as robust as the 
communication with the ‘central node’ (the Commission).9 
This feature of the network can help to explain why, so far at least, 
it has not watered down Community competition policy. If anything, it 
has strengthened both enforcement and policy focus. There have been no 
recorded cases of jurisdictional conflicts or other serious disagreements 
between the NCAs in dispensing their enforcement powers. Of course, 
as will be discussed below, the information we have is limited, but so far 
there is no reason to disagree with the Commission’s finding that:
Work sharing between the enforcers in the network has generally 
been unproblematic. Five years of experience have confirmed that 
the flexible and pragmatic arrangements introduced by Regulation 
1/2003 and the Network Notice work well. Discussions on case-
allocation have come up in very few cases and have been resolved 
swiftly.10
The Commission has not yet used its strongest weapon – removal, ie 
taking over a case initiated by an NCA. Despite a number of centrifugal 
tendencies, the network so far seems remarkably coherent and effective 
(which is not to say things cannot change). 
7 Commission Notice (EC) on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities 
[2004] OJ C101.
8 Firat Cengiz, ‘The European Competition Network: Structure, Management and Initi-
al Experiences of Policy Enforcement’ (2009) EUI Max Weber Programme Working Paper 
MWP 2009/5, 5-6. See also Cengiz (n 46) 14 ff, contrasting the features of the ECN with 
the features expected by network theory (eg central planning vs voluntary formation, lack 
of dispute resolution mechanisms vs strong dispute resolution mechanisms, hierarchy vs 
equal positions of members).
9 Cengiz, ‘European Competition Network’ (n 8) 10. See also Stephen Wilks, ‘Agencies, 
Networks, Discourses and the Trajectory of European Competition Enforcement’ (2007) 3 
European Competition Journal 437, 448.
10 Commission (EC) ‘Report on Competition Policy 2007’ COM (2008) 368 final, 16 June 
2008, 7.
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Co-operation within the ECN is not, however, exhausted by enforce-
ment, ie the application of a body of rules to individual cases. It is also 
a policy-planning network, even though its role in that respect is not 
fully transparent. The Commission is using the network as a platform 
for the development of a ‘common competition culture’.11 The NCAs are 
relying on it as an opportunity for their position to be heard and perhaps 
included in the formulation of Community policy.12 For some of the less 
experienced NCAs, it is presumably a forum for learning.13 
The network is not, however, developing policy from scratch or re-
negotiating its values in light of the NCAs’ inputs. Their supposed diffe-
rences have not been reflected in the development of Community policy 
so far. Rather, it will be argued in this paper that the ECN is so far being 
used to further a specific vision of competition policy, emanating prima-
rily from the Commission.
In the remaining sections of this paper, I will describe the functioning 
of the network, drawing on legal documents such as Regulation 1/2003, 
the Commission’s soft law documents, as well as on annual reports of 
several NCAs.14 I will attempt to advance the claim that the ECN is much 
more efficient, centralised, and less subject to pressures of divergence 
than a typical regulatory network, thanks in part to rules granting the 
Commission a centralising role, but also to the specific nature of compe-
tition law and policy, which fosters a highly technical, specialist discour-
se among experts, leading to the formation of an ‘epistemic community’. 
I will also address the role of the network in the planning and shaping 
of policy, arguing first that the network has already gone far in this regard, 
and, second, that in the near future the majority of the NCAs are likely to 
rally behind a specific vision of competition, rather than enrich or compli-
cate the policy debate. It will also be argued that there are two significant 
problems in using the ECN as a platform of policy development and disse-
mination: lack of transparency and lack of democratic accountability.
11 Commission Notice (n 7) para 1.
12 Wilks (n 9) 449.
13 For an example of such a perspective, see, eg, the press release ‘The Agency is Fit for EU’ 
issued by the Croatian Competition Agency in June 2009, describing the Agency’s coopera-
tion with their Austrian counterpart, the Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde: ‘... the Austrian com-
petition experts are more than willing to support their Croatian counterparts in competition 
advocacy, which effectively conducted, contributes to the establishment of what is referred 
to as a “competition culture”’ <http://www.aztn.hr/article/233/quotagencija-je-spremna-
za-euquot> accessed on 8 December 2010.
14 Given the lack of information on the ECN, the best, albeit incomplete and anecdotal, 
source on the discussions and procedures within the network are the reports issued by the 
NCAs and the Commission. The NCAs’ reports were chosen based on the level of detail with 
which their reports discuss the ECN and other forms of European co-operation. The reports 
used here are those of the German, French (Conseil de la Concurrence), Dutch, Czech, Ro-
manian and Polish NCAs.
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1.1. Theoretical puzzles
One of the reasons why the ECN has drawn considerable scholarly 
attention is the fact that it has so far functioned effectively, with no notice-
able rifts in policy or significant administrative deficiencies. In a nutshell, 
the ECN seems rather tightly integrated and committed to the pursuit 
of common policies. This stands in contrast to research on regulatory 
networks15 which shows the difficulty of co-ordinating diverse interests 
and values in a decentralised setting with flexible rules of co-operation. 
Competition policy does not seem to be a likely exception to those conclu-
sions16 - so how can the network’s effectiveness be explained?
First of all, the ECN does not neatly fit the description of such networ-
ks because of its structural centralising features, ie the significant degree 
of control given to the Commission.17 The very fact that co-operation is 
formalised through legal rules seems at odds with the network concept 
in which ‘management controls... emerge naturally as the networks con-
tinue to function...’, reflecting ‘routinized courses of conduct achieved 
through past cooperation experiences’.18 Formal rules of co-operation can 
thus prevent decentralisation. As I will argue, this partly solves the pu-
zzle, but not completely.
Another puzzle is that of an agent ceding hard-earned authority. Is 
the Commission truly giving away its monopoly in competition enforce-
ment? It has been argued that the Commission itself is not a good exam-
ple of an agent because it has outgrown that role; Majone describes it as 
a ‘trustee’ of competition policy.19 The Commission’s ability to go beyond 
its original mandate can also be at least partly explained by the lack of 
agreement among the more powerful Member States on how exactly to 
enforce their visions of competition, with the result that:
...the influence of the shadow of hierarchy by territorially bound de-
mocratic government on the efficiency of sectoral governance was 
quite limited. In turn, it was the Commission’s strategy to increase 
the efficiency of its policies by resorting to new modes of governance 
that bypassed both the member states and the European Parlia-
ment.20
A different question is how well the move towards decentralisation 
fits into a neofunctionalist framework which has been used to explain 
15 David Coen & Mark Thatcher, ‘Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: Europe-
an Networks of Regulatory Agencies’ (2008) 28 Journal of Public Policy 49, 56-59.
16 Wilks (n 9).
17 Cengiz, ‘European Competition Network’ (n 8) 8.
18 Cengiz, ‘European Competition Network’ (n 8) 9.
19 Majone (n 6) 104-105.
20 Lehmkuhl (n 6) 149.
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the gradual centralisation of competition enforcement in the hands of the 
European Commission’s DG Comp (see below in 3.1). Is this a step back, 
contrary to neofunctionalist expectations?21 Or can it be explained away 
by viewing the NCAs as part and parcel of the Commission’s functionally 
organised structure, while national political preferences play a larger role 
in the Council?22
These and other problems show that the specific case of the ECN, 
and more generally of competition law, is (unsurprisingly) difficult to fra-
me within a single theory. This paper will not try to provide definitive 
answers to theoretical questions as applied to competition enforcement, 
but will make use of the mentioned concepts insofar as they can help 
illustrate some of the issues raised.
1.2. Co-ordination in international antitrust
Before delving into the actual system of co-operation within the ECN, 
it is worth explaining briefly why competition policy creates cross-border 
issues and, arguably, requires transnational regulation or co-operation 
between regulators.
First of all, it is almost impossible to constrain the consequences of 
anticompetitive conduct within the borders of a single regulatory regi-
me.23 Even if the restraint took place in one state, it can have effects in 
another, whether explicitly (eg a price-fixing export cartel) or collaterally 
(eg a dumped price can affect all markets where a good is sold). Some 
potentially anticompetitive conduct directly affects international trade, 
such as a vertical restraint (eg an exclusive distribution agreement for 
good A in country X) coupled with the prohibition of so-called parallel 
imports (good A imported to country X from country Y to circumvent an 
exclusive distribution agreement). Some conduct is in itself transnati-
onal, such as an agreement between the world’s leading suppliers of a 
certain good to fix prices. 
Transnational restraints become more troublesome when you only 
have national laws and regulators.24 Their standards can vary, allowing 
undertakings to take advantage of lax competition rules of a certain ju-
risdiction to the detriment of competition elsewhere (especially in cases 
such as the already mentioned export cartels). There is also the problem 
of a narrow perspective: even under perfectly reasonable market analysis, 
21 Øivind Støle, ‘Towards a Multi-Level Community Administration? The Decentralization 
of EU Competition Policy’ (2005) ARENA Working Papers, WP 05/05, 14.
22 Støle (n 21) 18.
23 Eleanor M Fox, ‘The Elusive Promise of Modernisation: Europe and the World’ (2001) 28 
Legal Issues of Economic Integration 141, 146.
24 Eleanor M Fox, ‘Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, And Sideways’ 
(2000) 75 New York University Law Review 1781, 1800-1801.
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conduct which appears to be competitive locally can be anticompetitive 
globally, and vice versa. In many states, the rules are themselves (in 
a sense) extraterritorial, allowing restraints to be challenged whenever 
they affect the local market, but enforcement is still clearly domestic. 
Another complication is the fact that evidence may be located in many 
different countries, beyond the reach of a single regulator. All this, wit-
hout even getting into all the differences between the regulating institu-
tions themselves: differing incentives, institutional rules, independence, 
structure, competence, experience, etc.25
Similar problems have led to vigorous ongoing discussion on crea-
ting a global, multilateral competition agreement within the WTO.26 The-
se debates usually crystallise into two approaches to transnational re-
gulation. The first is relatively centralised: common rules, perhaps with 
common enforcement. The strongest form of this was the EC’s regime up 
to Regulation 1/2003. The second one is relatively decentralised: mainta-
ining the diversity of national laws and enforcement, but adopting some 
common principles or minimum standards and requiring some co-opera-
tion, such as mutual assistance in investigations.27 The EC’s modernised 
regime introduces some elements of the second solution. However, as 
I will argue, it would be wrong to think that what happened was, at its 
core, decentralisation.
2. A closer look at the modernised system
2.1. The nuts and bolts: Regulation 1/2003
The modernised system contains a number of provisions on the co-
operation of the Commission and the NCAs, which are at once robust 
and flexible. The Regulation, which applies to restrictive agreements and 
unilateral conduct under arts 101 and 102 TFEU, empowers the NCAs to 
apply EU competition rules in individual cases, decide that infringements 
be brought to an end, order interim measures, accept commitments and 
impose fines and penalties.28 It also contains a number of provisions on 
25 Petros C Mavroidis and Damien J Neven, ‘The White Paper: A Whiter Shade of Pale – Of 
Interest and Interests’ (2000) EUI-RSCAS/Competition 2000, 5, 9-10.
26 See eg Fox (n 24) 1786-88.
27 For a more detailed survey of possible approaches, see Roland Weinrauch, Competition 
Law in the WTO: The Rationale for a Framework Agreement (Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Ver-
lag, Vienna 2004) 111-129.
28 National courts are also authorised to apply those provisions (art 6). An important dis-
tinction that has to be kept in mind is that the Regulation deals with the application of EC 
competition rules, namely arts 81 and 82 EC. National competition laws still exist in the 
Member States. The details of the complex relationship between national and European 
competition rules are beyond the scope of this article. See, eg David J Gerber, Law and 
Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (OUP, Oxford 2001).
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the co-operation of the NCAs with each other and with the Commission, 
whose enforcement powers are laid out in even more detail.29 As a ge-
neral rule, the Regulation’s rules on co-operation with the Commission 
are mandatory, whereas the rules on co-operation between the NCAs are 
optional – but, according to the NCAs’ annual reports, largely followed.
Thus, an investigating NCA has to inform the Commission without 
delay, and may also inform the other NCAs, when it commences its first 
investigative measure.30 This option has been taken up by the NCAs,31 
and is done in practice by posting a notice on the common intranet32 or 
by publishing a so-called ‘New Case’ form.
In most cases, an NCA also has to notify the Commission 30 days 
before adopting a decision,33 again with the possibility of notifying the 
other NCAs. Apart from a summary of the case and the text of the propo-
sed decision, the Commission can request all other documents necessary 
for the assessment of the case. The NCAs are also free to exchange such 
documents amongst themselves, insofar as they are necessary for the 
assessment of an individual case. They have the power to provide one 
another with and use in evidence any matter of fact or of law, including 
confidential information.34 The NCAs’ reports indicate that this option is 
exercised.35
There is also a more general provision allowing the NCAs to consult 
the Commission on any case dealt with under Community law.36 This 
seems to extend to anything – facts, evidence, and even guidance on the 
proper legal or economic interpretation – that an NCA might be curious 
about when dealing with a specific case. The Commission, for its part, is 
bound to transmit to the NCAs ‘copies of the most important documents 
it has collected with a view to applying’ its enforcement powers – a remar-
kably broad, yet vague, duty (which documents, when and why?).
The NCAs are also bound to assist the Commission in obtaining evi-
dence, most prominently by conducting ‘dawn raids’ of the premises of 
companies suspected of wrongdoing. Several NCAs have indicated that 
29 Arts 7-10.
30 Art 11 para 3.
31 See Conseil de la Concurrence, 2006 Activity Report 36; Bundeskartellamt, Our Activi-
ties in 2003 and 2004 11-12. For a list of links to the NCAs’ annual reports, see <http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/annual_reports.html> (links hereinafter omitted). 
32 For example, in 2005 the Czech authority received 209 concentration notifications thro-
ugh the network. Office for the Protection of Competition, Annual Report 2005,31.
33 Art 11 para 4. 
34 Art 12.
35 The Dutch NCA has formed a special unit and a ‘disclosure officer’ for this purpose. See 
Netherlands Competition Authority, Annual Report 2004 – NMa and DTe 22.
36 Art 11 para 5.
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they have done so,37 and that they have also assisted the investigations 
of other NCAs.38 
How can the Commission control the NCAs’ potentially erroneous 
application of Community law? Apart from the less formal channels of 
notification and consultation mentioned above, the final step could be 
art 11/6, which allows the Commission to assume jurisdiction in any in-
dividual case. Not only does the initiation of a Commission investigation 
pre-empt NCAs from acting in the same case, but the Commission can 
also assume jurisdiction even if an NCA has already acted, as long as it 
‘consults’ the NCA. This power has, however, so far not been applied by 
the Commission, although the Commission is constantly reviewing the 
NCAs’ investigations informally.39
Finally, the European Competition Network as such was establis-
hed subsequently by the Commission’s ‘Network Notice’.40 The Notice lays 
down a number of rules on investigative procedures, most notably on the 
allocation of competences between the NCAs. These will be analysed in 
the following Section.
2.2. Allocation of competences in the ECN
When two NCAs start investigating the same practice, Regulation 
1/2003 stipulates that the fact that one of them is already dealing with 
it suffices for the others, or even the Commission, to suspend proceedin-
gs or reject the complaint.41 Apart from this, there is no legally binding 
system for the allocation of competences between the NCAs. One could 
imagine an almost endless set of jurisdictional criteria: turnover of the 
firms being investigated, location of evidence, place where a restrictive 
agreement was concluded, etc. However, the system does not try to do 
this, maintaining the NCAs’ parallel competence.
The Notice implements the possibilities of co-operation sketched by 
the Regulation, giving them shape and detail, while clarifying the alloca-
tion of competences. Some criteria are laid down for the selection of the 
authority ‘well placed’ to take over,42 but as a general rule, the NCA that 
37 See Netherlands Competition Authority, NMa Annual Report 2005, 101.
38 In one its reports, for example, the German Bundeskartellamt mentioned that it conduc-
ted a search on behalf of the Italian NCA, taking testimony from witnesses, and received 
similar assistance from the Austrian NCA. In the same period, it assisted the European 
Commission in ten inspections. See Bundeskartellamt, Our Activities in 2003 and 2004, 14.
39 Commission (EC) ‘Report on Competition Policy 2007’ COM (2008) 368 final, 16 June 
2008, 21.
40 See n 7.
41 Art 13.
42 Commission Notice (n 7) paras 7-10.
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takes hold of the case first has jurisdiction.43 Joint investigations are po-
ssible in cases where one NCA cannot deal with the case effectively, and 
the Commission should take over when the markets of more than three 
Member States are affected.44 The Notice requires the NCAs to notify each 
other of new investigations and share information extensively.45 
The relative laxity of these rules led some to believe that jurisdicti-
onal conflicts would be a big issue in the network.46 It seems, however, 
that this has not been the case. The NCAs do not seem to be trying to 
pre-empt their peers by starting investigations. Rather, they engage in in-
formal, often multilateral discussions within the network and decide who 
is best placed to investigate,47 and for cases involving several jurisdicti-
ons there is always the possibility of reallocation to the Commission.48 In 
addition, the Commission’s powers of information, supervision and remo-
val are indeed a strong hedge against the risk of regulatory divergence.49 
However, the Commission’s procedural powers cannot fully explain the 
close integration within the ECN.
2.3. Beyond the call of duty – implementing the co-operation rules
The system of information sharing within the network is succinctly 
described in an annual report of the Czech NCA:
By means of the ECN Interactive network, the competition authoriti-
es and the Commission inform each other about the commencement 
of cases, their interruption and about requests for the application of 
the so called Leniency Program.50
43 Commission Notice (n 7) para 6.
44 Commission Notice (n 7) para 14.
45 Commission Notice (n 7) paras 2.2.1 – 2.2.3.
46 See Firat Cengiz, ‘Regulation 1/2003 Revisited’ (2009) TILEC Discussion Paper DP 2009-
042, 18-19, and the works cited in footnote 69.
47 For example, the Dutch NCA reports that a case ‘initially subject to the scrutiny of 
various national competition authorities (of which the NMa was one) was referred to the 
Commission because of the international status of the markets involved’.  See Netherlands 
Competition Authority, NMa Annual Report 2005, 102.
48 Cengiz ‘European Competition Network’ (n 8) 18. As mentioned before, there do not 
seem to be serious problems with the way this allocation system works, and the NCAs seem 
quite happy to negotiate their jurisdiction informally. For example, the German Bundeskar-
tellamt reported that in 2007-2008 one of the cases in which it started the investigation 
was transferred to the Commission’s jurisdiction, one from the Commission’s jurisdiction 
was transferred for it to investigate, and one was investigated in parallel. See Deutscher 
Bundestag, ‘Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes über seine Tätigkeit in den Jahren 2007/2008 
sowie über die Lage und Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet’ 47. 
49 Oliver Budzinski & Andt Christiansen, ‘Competence Allocation in the EU Competition 
Policy System as an Interest-Driven Process’ (2005) 25 Journal of Public Policy 313, 319; 
Francesco Maria Salerno, ‘The Competition Law-ization of Enforcement: The Way Forward 
for Making the Energy Market Work?’ (2008) EUI RSCAS Working Paper 2008/7, 5-6.
50 See n 32.
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An overview of the NCAs’ reports confirms the Commission’s claim that 
‘the actual intensity, scope and potential of cooperation within the ECN 
go beyond the legal obligations set out in Regulation 1/2003’.51 Some of 
it even goes beyond what the Directive foresees as an option (for example, 
the French NCA states that it also informs other NCAs and the Commi-
ssion of ‘closed cases’52). The way this actually works is well described in 
an annual report of the French NCA:
This co-ordination mainly takes two forms: firstly, at the start of pro-
ceedings, the authorities are required to inform one another about 
the cases pending before them, so that discussions can be held and, 
where appropriate, certain cases allocated between the authorities 
best placed to hear them, to ensure they are dealt with as efficiently 
as possible. Secondly, before the national authority concerned adop-
ted a decision, the Commission oversees the proceedings to ensure 
the overall system is consistent.53
An important feature of the system is that the NCAs are using the po-
ssibilities for informal information exchange not only to co-ordinate 
their jurisdiction among themselves and tip each other off on potential 
wrongdoings,54 but also to run their proposed decisions by the Commi-
ssion. There does not seem to be any obstacle for the Commission’s input 
on the legal interpretation or economic reasoning overriding the initial 
position taken by the NCAs – in the name of ‘consistency’ of the system. 
Since this communication is not disclosed, for the sake of confidentiality, 
it is hard to know what exactly goes on. It should be expected that the 
Commission is not overly aggressive in trying to substitute its interpre-
tation for that adopted by the NCA, but it can certainly steer it, case by 
case, towards the ‘correct’ application of Community rules.
The interplay between the NCAs themselves seems equally robust. 
Through their information sharing arrangements, they obtain detailed 
insight into each other’s practice, which is deepened in informal discu-
ssions of cases. As described in a French report:
51 Commission Report (n 39) 20.
52 See n 31, 37.
53 See n 31, 35.
54 For example, the Czech NCA ‘informally informed the Irish competition authority on a 
possible breach of the Article 81 of the EC Treaty by a company seated in Ireland. In rela-
tion to a prohibited agreement of candidates to a public contract (bid rigging), operating in 
most EU countries, a party to which applied for the benefits of the leniency programme, 
the Office communicated with the European  Commission and the Slovak, Hungarian and 
Polish competition authority’. Office for the Protection of Competition, Annual Report 2004, 
35.
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This system of reciprocal information ... gives each national compe-
tition authority ... visibility over its counterparts’ activities and, in 
practical terms, enables investigating case officers to share details 
of actual cases and pool their experience. ... Discussions about ca-
ses take place well before the authority concerned adopts a deci-
sion. They form a sort of interactive, dynamic system enabling the 
different authorities to pool their knowledge and expertise, so as to 
ensure that infringements are dealt with as effectively as possible.55
The emphasis on ‘reciprocal’ information exchange suggests that the 
NCAs have a strong interest in ensuring that all network participants 
co-operate more or less to the same extent.56 Those who try to evade this 
reciprocity might be condemned as free riders – benefiting from the in-
formation of others, asserting their jurisdiction vis-à-vis other NCAs or 
asking for assistance (eg in obtaining evidence), but holding out in some 
aspects of the information sharing mechanism. This peer pressure, if it 
indeed takes place, amounts to a strong guarantee of the effectiveness 
and ‘depth’ of the network. This, along with other available evidence, spe-
aks in favour of the Commission’s finding (in 2007) of a:
...continuation of the convergence process observed in the context 
of Regulation 1/2003. Over and above legal obligations arising from 
implementation of the Regulation, there is a trend towards greater 
approximation of national procedural laws and policies.57
Of course, even though all this takes place in the context of individu-
al investigations, it is hardly plausible that this kind of co-ordination does 
not affect the NCAs’ policy approach more generally. It is not realistic to 
maintain clear distinctions between policy-making and enforcement. The 
changing patterns, priorities and practical concerns in enforcement ne-
cessarily feed back into changes of policy.58 That said, the ECN also deals 
with competition policy in more direct ways. 
2.4. The ECN’s policy planning channels 
The ECN is also a policy network,59 even though the Commission 
undoubtedly remains the most important policy actor in the network, 
burdened with no significant formal restraints.60 Unfortunately, it is hard 
to learn much about this aspect of the network, but for the reports of the 
agencies. However, it seems clear that the network is indeed taking an 
55 See n 31, 36.
56 Cengiz , ‘European Competition Network’ (n 8) 12.
57 Commission Report (n 39) 21.
58 Wilks (n 9) 442.
59 But see Wilks (n 9) 440 for a view that the network is ‘primarily’ about enforcement.
60 Cengiz, ‘European Competition Network’ (n 8) 13.
87CYELP 6 [2010] 75-101
important role in policy formulation, which also links back to the harmo-
nisation of national competition laws beyond what is required by moder-
nisation61 (see below in 3.4). 
The image which emerges when studying the NCAs’ reports is the 
following: network members regularly meet to discuss the future of 
Community competition policy, spurred mostly by proposals of the Com-
mission which has by and large remained the agenda-setter in EC com-
petition policy. So far, most of the significant policy initiatives discussed 
within the ECN have come from the Commission. Some of the examples 
are the Green Paper and White Paper on private enforcement and the 
guidelines on the application of art 82 (see below in 4.1), adopted after 
consultations with the NCAs and taking their responses into account.
Policy discussions within the ECN take place in three regular settin-
gs: plenary meetings, working groups and in the Advisory Committee, as 
well as through ad hoc channels.
Plenary meetings, which take place every three months on avera-
ge, are devoted to the most general policy issues, to the review of the 
work of working groups, and are, most generally, used to ‘adopt common 
policies’.62 Some of the topics covered at plenary meetings over the last 
few years have included the model leniency programme, draft Commu-
nity legislation and the practicalities of co-operation within the network.
A number of working groups and subgroups are devoted to specific 
sectors, ‘exchanging sectoral information and sharing experiences’, as 
well as agreeing ‘upon a common approach’, ‘if possible’.63 These grou-
ps are usually co-chaired by the Commission and one NCA.64 The wor-
king groups and subgroups cover areas as diverse as pharmaceuticals, 
professional and financial services, motor vehicles, the environment, te-
lecommunications, banking, energy, media, food products, insurance, 
etc. Some of the groups are devoted to general competition enforcement 
issues, such as sanctions and the ne bis in idem principle, competiti-
on and consumer protection, co-operation issues, and ‘information and 
communications’.65
Interestingly, some of the working groups discuss policy areas which 
sometimes fall outside the normal remit of competition policy.  For exam-
ple, the French and Dutch NCAs indicate that they worked on reports on 
the retail banking and payment card markets during 2005 and 2006.66 
61 Cengiz, ‘European Competition Network’ (n 8) 19.
62 See n 31, 38.
63 See Netherlands Competition Authority, NMa Annual Report 2005, 100.
64 See n 31, 38.
65 For a fuller list, see Romanian Competition Council, Annual Report 2007, 53-55.
66 Netherlands Competition Authority, NMa Annual Report 2006, 30; see n 31, 38-39.
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In 2008, the Commission reported publishing its own study in this area 
– based on the NCAs’ studies discussed within the ECN – which found, 
among other things, that ‘markets remain fragmented along national li-
nes’ and that ‘high degrees of variation of prices, profit margins and se-
lling patterns ... were found to be indicative of persisting regulatory ... 
barriers to competition’.67 These are certainly legitimate concerns for the 
Commission, but regulatory barriers to competition are normally consi-
dered to be out of the scope of arts 81 and 82, and competition policy 
more broadly. They could perhaps be addressed under the EC Treaty 
provisions on free movement of services and/or capital, but that is far 
from the ambit of the ECN. Therefore, either the NCAs discuss issues of 
Community policy not related to the tasks they have been entrusted with, 
or the Commission uses the NCAs for research assistance in the formu-
lation of Community policy.
The group with potentially the most profound effect on competiti-
on policy must be the working group of Chief Economists. This group 
assembles the top economists of the NCAs (many of which have recently 
introduced the position, modelled on that of the Commission and some 
of the more prominent NCAs) and of the Commission. It evolved from a 
seminar on the use of simulation models for mergers (an issue not legally 
under the remit of the ECN), organised by the Dutch NCA.68 The direct 
impetus for its formation came, tellingly, from the Commission:
Mr. Oliver Stehmann, a member of the Chief Economist’s Office at 
the EU Commission, indicated that since the economic assessment 
is becoming increasingly important to the handling of cases invol-
ving anticompetitive  practices and mergers, it appeared sensible for 
the competition authorities to come together to discuss the issue.69
It is hard to overstate the potential importance of this group. Econo-
mic analysis is an indispensable element of any antitrust investigation, 
especially under the now prevalent understandings of antitrust (see be-
low in 3.1), and many of the officials working on such cases are economi-
sts by training. Agreeing on common principles of economic analysis is 
thus clearly not only a technical or academic issue, or even a gap-filler: it 
is tantamount to policy alignment.
The third form of policy co-operation is the Advisory Committee. The 
Network Notice defines it as ‘the forum where experts from the various 
competition authorities discuss individual cases and general issues of 
Community competition law’.70 Typically, the advisory committee asse-
sses the Commission’s analysis of an individual case, perhaps suggesting 
67 Commission Report (n 39) 10.
68 See Netherlands Competition Authority, Annual Report 2004 – NMa and DTe 49.
69 See n 31 40.
70 Commission Notice (n 7) para 58.
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changes. The Commission has to consult the Committee and to take ‘the 
utmost account’ of its opinion. However, the Advisory Committee is also 
consulted on more general policy issues:
...the Advisory Committee does not just give its opinion on the 
Commission’s decisions. For example, in 2006, it gave its verdict on 
the Commission’s new guidelines for calculating fines.71 
Finally, there is also a number of ad hoc collaborative projects betwe-
en the European Commission and the NCAs, such as a task force on the 
internal market for payment services (SEPA Task Force). There is also a 
system of staff exchange within ECA (European Competition Authorities), 
which is a less formal, ‘think tank’ network involving, apart from ECN 
members, also the Swiss and Norwegian NCAs.
Many of the NCAs, as well as the Commission itself, are also engaged 
in capacity building, where training sessions are organised for candida-
te and partner countries. Such a form of co-operation is the so-called 
Marchfeld forum, which sets up a parallel, softer system of co-operation 
between the Commission and ECN Members from Central and Eastern 
Europe, along with Croatia and Switzerland.72
2.5. An example of soft harmonisation: The Model Leniency Pro-
gramme 
One of the most prominent issues addressed within the ECN is the 
Leniency Programme. Leniency allows undertakings that are party to an 
illegal cartel to come forward and provide information, in exchange for 
immunity or lower fines. Before the ECN, leniency applications were a si-
gnificant burden for undertakings, since they had to be separately filed in 
a number of Member States as well as with the Commission, under radi-
cally different rules (with regard to time limits, criteria, etc.), which incre-
ased the costs and complexity and jeopardised confidentiality.73 In cases 
which may involve several EU jurisdictions, undertakings did not have an 
incentive to report cartels unless they satisfied the leniency requirements 
of the strictest regime, thus creating an ‘undesirable “race-to-the-top”’.74
This is why the ECN was used to develop, in 2006, a Model Leniency 
Programme.75 This Model Programme has so far been quite successfully 
71 See n 31, 41.
72 See the Marchfeld Declaration, Memorandum of Understanding (2008) <http://www.
bwb.gv.at/NR/rdonlyres/A2914C5A-0462-4AAE-8A6D-3394E87540D9/35231/Memoran-
dumofUnderstanding.pdf> accessed on 7 December 2010.. 
73 Wilks (n 6) 443.
74 Cengiz (n 46) 33.
75 The text of the programme is available at <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/mo-
del_leniency_en.pdf> accessed on 7 December 2010.
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and voluntarily used by most of the Member States to harmonise their 
leniency rules. Apart from harmonising national leniency provisions, the 
Model Programme simplified the application process by allowing under-
takings to file a full application to the Commission and only a summary 
application to the NCAs, provided that the Commission is best placed to 
address that particular case.76
Today, all the Member States except two have leniency programmes, 
whereas in 2002, before Regulation 1/2003 and the formation of the 
ECN, only four did. The Model Leniency Programme is also the basis for 
the Commission’s own Leniency Notice. As a result of this harmonisation, 
undertakings still have to prepare multiple filings, but can rely on a set of 
similar substantive criteria and procedural rules. While the convergence 
is an ongoing process and not everything is harmonised everywhere, the 
Programme has so far been a success.
The Leniency Programme has been described as ‘the most remar-
kable achievement’ of the ECN’s policy fora.77 It is a good example of a 
substantive outcome that can be produced within the ECN, with political 
impetus coming from the Commission, but with most of the discussions 
taking place in an ECN expert group, with subsequent endorsement from 
the heads of all the ECN members. The ECN’s Report on the Programme 
indicates that ‘the work within the ECN has been a major catalyst in 
encouraging Member States and/or authorities to introduce and develop 
their leniency policies and in promoting convergence between them’.78
3. The Europeanisation of competition
As we have seen, the ECN has largely been a mobilising and unifying 
force in the context of both individual investigations and overall policy 
planning. There is, however, more to be said on the nature of competition 
regulation and how such a unifying effect has been achieved. 
3.1. Competition as a supranational policy
Competition policy has been dubbed the ‘best example of a supra-
nationalized policy’79 in the EU, and the Commission’s Directorate Ge-
neral for Competition (DG Comp) has even been called a ‘transnational 
76 See European Competition Network, ‘ECN Model Leniency Programme: Report on Asse-
ssment of the State of Convergence’ <ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/model_leniency_pro-
gramme.pdf> 1-2 accessed on 7 December 2010.
77 Cengiz, ‘European Competition Network’ (n 8) 19.
78 See n 76, 18-19.
79 Lee McGowan, ‘Europeanization Unleashed and Rebounding: Assessing the Moderniza-
tion of EU Cartel Policy’ (2005) 12 Journal of European Public Policy 986, 988.
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agency’.80 Thanks to significant delegation from the Council, the Commi-
ssion has so far regulated the competition field with an unprecedented 
degree of independence, both in policymaking and enforcement. This is 
the context within which the ECN should be understood. 
As McGowan has argued, competition policy is a good illustration 
of neofunctionalism – the system created by the Member States forming 
‘a superimposed community of bureaucrats and lawyers whose decisi-
ons came to influence and determine policy approaches at both national 
and supranational levels’. Once created, ‘the supranational competition 
regime started to develop its own dynamics and trajectory’.81 Over time, 
DG Comp has become more and more assertive in its approach, and 
the Commission has grown to be the undoubted focal point of Europe-
an competition policy. This development was assisted by the business 
community which favoured a more centralised and predictable system of 
governance, also fitting into the neofunctionalist framework.82 
Centralisation did not take place on the basis of majoritarian deci-
sion-making. The Commission itself has favoured regulation by soft law 
- guidelines and other non-binding measures.83 In turn, it has been assi-
sted by the European Court of Justice and the General Court (formerly 
the Court of First Instance). For example, the ECJ imposed a duty on 
national courts to take non-binding Commission recommendations into 
account.84 Even if the ECJ is critical of the Commission’s decisions in 
individual cases, judicial review can protect legal certainty and grant le-
gitimacy to the Commission’s role:
For one, we might expect a positive impact on the overall efficiency of 
European competition policy, which may find expression in a higher 
degree of legal certainty, in more coherence in the Commission’s 
application of new modes of governance, and in a less disputed dis-
tribution of cases between national and supranational jurisdicti-
ons.85 
How does the ECN fit into this story? ‘Decentralisation’ was itself initia-
ted by the Commission because of its strained resources.86 In its latest 
report, the Commission seems satisfied at this level, claiming that de-
centralisation has enabled it to ‘focus its resources on areas where it can 
80 Wilks (n 9) 438.
81 Lee McGowan, ‘Theorising European Integration: Revisiting Neo-Functionalism and Te-
sting its Suitability for Explaining the Development of EC Competition Policy?’ (2007) EioP 
Working Paper 2007-003, 25 May 2007, 4.1.
82 McGowan  (n 81) 4.3; Budzinski & Christiansen (n 49) 318.
83 Lehmkuhl (n 6) 148, 150.
84 Lehmkuhl (n 6) 151.
85 Lehmkuhl (n 6) 158.
86 Budzinski & Christiansen (n 49) 320; Cengiz , ‘European Competition Network’ (n 8) 8-9.
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make a significant contribution to the enforcement of Articles [101] and 
[102 TFEU]’ and be more proactive, eg by launching several large sector 
inquiries.87
However, as has been pointed out, this cannot be the only reason 
– not only does decentralisation incur costs of adjustment, but it only 
makes sense insofar as the NCAs themselves are able to take on the 
excess tasks of the Commission, which is questionable.88 Since it was 
acknowledged that the capabilities of the NCAs differ widely, it is not cle-
ar why the Commission would want decentralisation. Yet, it is perfectly 
clear that it was initiated by the Commission, and not because of majori-
tarian or political pressures.89 
There are several plausible explanations for this, apart from the re-
source problem. The explanation most often put forward by the Commi-
ssion itself is the creation of a ‘common competition culture’.90 Because of 
the learning and allegiance shifts that take place in a community of non-
political experts (see below in 4.2), the actual result of decentralisation is 
the reinforcement of a common European competition policy. 
The Commission’s gradual assertion of regulatory power in compe-
tition policy since the inception of the EC has been described as ‘agency 
escape’.91 Instead of following the mandate given to it by the principals 
(the Member States), the agent (Commission) has taken on an active role 
that can no longer be easily restrained by the principals. In a similar vein, 
the NCAs’ role within the network may not be connected with any reas-
sertion of power on the part of the Member States. Rather, it can be des-
cribed as ‘double delegation’92 – the NCAs’ loyalties lie within the network 
just as much as within their own state. These points are addressed in 
more detail below.
3.2. Drivers of convergence and centralisation 
A number of features of competition policy show that it is not condu-
cive to independent, divergent development in a community of regulators 
such as the ECN. Rather, the desire for effective competition regulation 
in such a technical field has a strong centralising effect.
87 Commission (EC) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council: Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003 COM (2009) 206 final, 29 
April 2009.
88 Budzinski & Christiansen (n 49) 320.
89 Wilks (n 6) 436.
90 See n 9.
91 Wilks, Lehmkuhl (n 6).
92 See Coen & Thatcher (n 15) 50-51. According to them, ‘the weakness of the networks and 
the controls of their principals help to explain why double delegation was agreed to by both 
national and EU actors’. 
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On the one hand, competition regulation is highly technical and 
requires skills in both legal and economic analysis. This naturally leads 
regulators to look to more experienced peers, rather than, for example, 
political actors within their own country. This is particularly the case 
with smaller NCAs. Who better to look to for guidance but the only agency 
with significant previous experience in enforcing EU competition rules – 
the Commission? As a consequence, developments in European compe-
tition law are transplanted to the national level not only by virtue of legal 
hierarchy, but as a result of learning.
Moreover, an international outlook is a natural instinct for European 
competition lawyers, given that competition law in Europe was disse-
minated in the Member States’ national laws, almost exclusively, only 
after its adoption in the Treaties (the most notable exception being Ger-
man competition law93). Competition law has always primarily reflected 
a common EU policy. After half a century of such policy making, decen-
tralised enforcement among agencies is unlikely to lead to drastically 
divergent views.
In practical terms, tight integration is also helped by the fact that the 
competition regulators’ community is relatively small and, increasingly, 
well connected internationally. This has been described as an ‘epistemic 
community’,94 consisting of European and national agencies, academics, 
law firms and business entities.95  While this development has occurred 
gradually over the years, through the formation of communities of aca-
demics and practitioners, seminars, conferences, etc, in the European 
context it has also been actively pursued by the Commission.96 One of 
the explanations of the fact that the ECN is functioning well is precisely 
the ‘success of competition specialists in the epistemic community in 
working with and through DG Comp to create a persuasive set of coordi-
native discourses’.97  
Direct contact with the regulated entities has been central in tran-
sforming DG Comp into Europe’s foremost competition regulator.98 This 
contact is not lost with decentralisation, in that the Commission still con-
ducts individual investigations; indeed, its powers to investigate and fine 
93 For an account of those early days, see Giuliano Marenco, ‘The Birth of Modern Com-
petition Law in Europe’ in Armin von Bogdandy, Petros C Mavroidis and Yves Mény (eds), 
European Integration and International Co-Ordination: Studies in Transnational Economic 
Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002) 279.
94 Stephen Wilks, ‘Understanding Competition Policy Networks in Europe: A Political Sci-
ence Perspective’ (2002) EUI RSCAS Proceedings, 9. See also Cengiz (n 46) 2 footnote 5.
95 David J Gerber, ‘The Evolution of a European Competition Law Network’ (2002) EUI 
RSCAS Proceedings, 19.
96 Wilks (n 9) 451-453.
97 Wilks (n 9) 455.
98 Salerno (n 49) 2-3.
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were strengthened by Regulation 1/2003. Including the NCAs into this 
discourse, however, can only serve to grow and further develop a sense of 
community among experts, focusing the debate on common issues99 and 
aligning interests.100
The Global Competition Review now even publishes yearly ‘rankin-
gs’ of dozens of competition agencies101. The fact that such rankings are 
possible shows that competition policy in most developed countries, and 
certainly within the EU, presents problems that are so similar that a 
common frame of reference and assessment can be made. One of the 
most recent GCR surveys concluded that ‘the playing field is becoming 
increasingly leveled, and there are ever fewer differences in the analytical 
skills of the leading authorities’.102 
This is not to say that all differences have disappeared. Indeed, re-
cent studies show that the NCAs of the EU can still be divided into seve-
ral groups according to their institutional capacity, with the UK, French 
and German NCAs coming out on top.103 The fact that these differences 
are diminishing can be explained at least in part by the Commission’s 
influence. Thus, Lehmkuhl has argued that institutional disparities lead 
to the Commission’s guidelines, notices, etc, acquiring an almost binding 
character in practice.104
Interestingly, as conveyed by Wilks: 
The survey indicates levels of prestige, both administrative and 
doctrinal. It therefore reflects ideas in good currency and it is signifi-
cant that the German Bundeskartellamt (BKA) has fallen in prestige. 
The  GCR  remarks  that  the  ‘Federal Cartel  Office was once per-
haps the world’s most influential antitrust authority, [but] now finds 
itself  adrift from the mainstream, clinging stubbornly to the per se 
rule of anti-competitive behavior’.105
This shows that the emergence of an ‘epistemic community’ is more than 
just an important unifying force in European competition law. Over the 
years, it has led to harmonisation of national competition laws beyond 
99 Fox (n 23) 144.
100 Gerber (n 95) 18.
101 See Global Competition Review <http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/surveys/
survey/376/Rating-Enforcement/> accessed on 7 December 2010. See also Wilks (n 9) 443. 
The US (FTC) and UK (Competition Commission) agencies and the European Commission 
usually end up at the top. The criteria for assessment are quite detailed: for example, ‘the 
use of IT to speed evidence-sifting, handling a “mass leniency” application by an entire in-
dustry, being “tough” on dawn raids’ etc.
102 The Netherlands Competition Authority, NMa Annual Report 2007, 45.
103 Wilks (n 9) 447.
104 Lehmkuhl (n 6) 151.
105 Wilks (n 9) 444.
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what was required by Community law (in fact, even in the separate sphe-
res of purely national competition laws, see below in 3.4) and far beyond 
what could have been achieved by top-down pressure from the Commi-
ssion and the European Court of Justice.106 Today, it is also increasingly 
leading to convergence in what is considered solid economic and legal 
thinking.
3.3. Depoliticisation and regulatory independence 
More recently, the Commission has been moving strongly in the 
direction of a depoliticised competition policy, independent of other re-
gulatory concerns. In the earlier history of the European Community, 
competition rules were seen as only one part of the broader political goal 
of European integration, specifically as a necessary complement to free 
movement rules, which protect the circulation of economic factors from 
regulatory interference of the Member States.107 The idea was to prevent 
private restraints, such as exclusionary conduct or restrictive agreements 
among undertakings, from taking the place of governmental barriers.
Today, however, the tendency is to view competition rules as being 
independent. Competition policy is no longer merely about integration.108 
It is concerned more directly with protecting market efficiency: preven-
ting restraints which cannot themselves be justified by procompetitive 
(and only procompetitive) considerations.109 This approach is at least so-
mewhat influenced by modern US antitrust law: protecting ‘competiti-
on, not competitors’ by preventing loss to consumer welfare. There is 
resistance, for example, against using non-efficiency based justifications 
(such as, for example, environmental protection) for anticompetitive con-
duct, or against interfering with conduct which leads to discernible effici-
encies, such as lower prices. 
There is no need here to assess the value of that approach. Its pro-
ponents describe earlier EC practice as overly formalistic and legalistic; 
its detractors, meanwhile, criticise the new approach as too narrow and 
influenced by ‘Chicago-school’ thinking. What is relevant to this discu-
ssion is that the Commission is solidifying its view of competition policy 
through the ECN. 
106 Frans van Waarden & Michaela Drahos, ‘Courts and (Epistemic) Communities in the 
Convergence of Competition Policies’ (2002) 9 Journal of European Public Policy 913, 932- 
933.
107 Heike Schweitzer, ‘The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Section 2 
Sherman Act and Article 82 EC’ (2007) EUI RSCAS Proceedings 40.
108 Cengiz (n 46) 28. 
109 Wilks (n 6) 440.
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For example, the Commission has used the ECN to pursue innova-
tions such as private enforcement (see below in 4.1). Quasi-legislative 
instruments such as the Commission’s guidelines on exclusionary con-
duct, adopted after consultations within the ECN, are widely seen as 
furthering a new, more economic approach. The adoption of formal policy 
co-ordination mechanisms within the ECN, such as the Working Group 
of Chief Economists, shows a tendency towards harmonising the econo-
mic reasoning underlying antitrust enforcement.
Closely linked to this is the strong emphasis on the independence 
of the NCAs. By avoiding political pressures and focusing on a technical 
discourse among experts, the agencies are more suited to rallying aro-
und unified assumptions and objectives, especially if their independence 
ever comes into question. This certainly repudiates the fear that national 
political influence will lead to policy divergence among the Commission 
and the NCAs:
As  regards  sectoral  agency solidarity,  almost  without  exception 
the  NCAs  are  depoliticized  agencies  with delegated  powers  who 
are  fiercely jealous  of  their  independence. Their  legal foundations, 
their  self-esteem  and  their  operational  credibility  all  rely  upon 
maintaining  independence  from politicians,  government ministries 
and powerful indigenous business interests. In this setting external 
support from sister agencies and from DG Comp is a powerful wea-
pon of defense.110
Even before the ascent of the ECN, national competition authorities 
were seen to be growing in independence and professionalism, which 
explains why the role of national allegiances in the ECN is not as signifi-
cant as might be expected.111 
3.4. Feedback: European and national competition law
Even though the NCAs are to a significant extent independent of the-
ir national polities (at least to the extent explained by ‘double delegation’), 
the policies discussed and agreed within the ECN, primarily meant to 
govern only at the level of EU law, are increasingly adopted as binding na-
tional law in their respective countries. National competition law mirrors 
EU rules, even though there is no legal obligation to do so. 
110 Wilks (n 9) 450. Budzinski and Christiansen (n 49) 317 approach the problem diffe-
rently: ‘Hence, the large Member States typically show a high interest in preserving their 
competences, which makes them the natural opponents of centralisation in competition 
policy matters. The same applies to the NCAs, which is why we treat them together with 
their respective governments.’ 
111 Støle (n 21) 16.
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The division of competences in competition law thus becomes, in 
itself, a factor contributing to regulatory convergence. Even though com-
petition law falls within the exclusive competences of the EU, there are 
still 27 national competition laws, enforced by the respective NCAs. This is 
because EU competition rules apply only to the extent that trade between 
Member States is affected. Falling below that threshold is any number of 
cases to which only national rules apply. As long as those national rules 
do not jeopardise the exercise of EU competences in some way, they can 
be different from European rules, even in ostensibly similar situations.
Predictably, however, there is no clear line between practices that do 
or do not affect cross-border trade. Interpretations of this concept by the 
European Court of Justice have been largely permissive, ie in favour of 
the applicability of EU law.112
This lack of a clear distinction has led to the development of bodi-
es of rules which are largely convergent. National competition laws - at 
least their basic principles and the broad features of the enforcement 
powers, if not the entirety of the procedural rules - are being modelled 
to mirror European rules, a process which many NCAs support or even 
advocate. This can be explained by the obvious difficulty in exercising two 
parallel but completely different jurisdictions. Since it is not entirely clear 
if EU law or national law will apply in a given set of cases, the enforce-
ment of very different bodies of laws would probably be an administrative 
nightmare. Consequently, national competition laws have been amended 
to approximate EU rules, even on matters of procedure. For example, the 
Dutch legislature has abolished the national system of notification and 
exemption after this was done at the EU level by Regulation 1/2003.113
Moreover, there is evidence that the ‘pull’ of the European approach 
has caused national courts and NCAs to change their views on some 
prominent competition policy issues, whether in the context of EU or 
national law.114 
112 Wilks (n 5) 445.
113 The Netherlands Competition Authority, Annual Report 2004 – NMa and DTe, 22.
114 Thus, the Dutch NCA reports that:
- ‘following European case law, there is a clearly discernible trend in national case law 
towards a greater emphasis by the courts on the economic effects of prohibited practices’ 
(2006 Report);
- ‘the NMa’s merger control has been brought further in line with European competition law; 
... when assessing mergers, the focus is now more on the question of whether competition 
is being restricted by a merger and less on whether it is being caused by an economically 
dominant position; ... from now on, besides mergers and acquisitions, cooperative joint 
ventures will also be inspected’ (2007 Report);
- ‘...by reducing fines the NMa aims to contribute to the enforcement of competition legi-
slation by means of the injured party’s demand for compensation as directed towards the 
undertakings which have acted in breach of competition law; ... this so-called civil enforce-
ment is furthered by the European Commission as part of the modernisation of communal 
competition law’ (2005 Report).
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There are at least two conclusions to be drawn at this point. First, 
the intellectual influence of European competition policy and the admini-
strative convenience of applying similar rules to similar situations lead to 
the convergence of national and European rules far beyond what is requ-
ired by the supremacy of European law. Second, even though the NCAs 
show a high degree of independence from their national governments, the 
policies agreed within the ECN are adopted, by national legislatures, into 
national law. This implies that the NCAs are able, at least to some extent, 
to influence their own governments and/or legislatures.
4. A caveat and a challenge
4.1. The caveat: possible pressures for divergence
Even if the Commission’s voice is so far dominant within the ECN, 
some NCAs still take clearly opposite policy positions. An example is the 
opposition of the German NCA to two of the Commission’s most signifi-
cant policy documents in the field of competition policy in recent years: 
its White Paper on private enforcement115 and its guidance on the enfor-
cement of art 82 EC (exclusionary conduct).116 
The private enforcement guidelines are influenced by American law, 
with the goal of making it easier for individuals to obtain damages from 
firms that breach competition rules. With its Green Paper and, more re-
cently, White Paper, the Commission is opening the debate for a possi-
ble legislative solution, requiring certain minimum procedural standards 
from the Member States.
This approach has met strong resistance from the German Bunde-
skartellamt, arguing that there is no need for legislation at the European 
level at all and that such an approach would jeopardise coherence in the 
Member States’ systems of tort law. There have also been more specific 
objections to the proposed system of anonymous class actions and dis-
covery processing.117
Similarly, the Bundeskartellamt opposes the introduction of market 
efficiency defences for art 82 exclusionary conduct, relying on the fact 
that they are only provided for in the text of art 81 EC.118 The Conseil de 
115 Commission (EC) White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM (2008) 165 final, 2 April 2008.
116 Commission (EC) Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Ar-
ticle 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings C 
(2009) 864 final, 9 February 2009.
117 See Bundeskartellamt, Our Activities in 2005 and 2006 16.
118 Bundeskartellamt (n 117) 14-15.
99CYELP 6 [2010] 75-101
la Concurrence, however, has taken the opposite position.119 Both NCAs 
have argued that the likely market effect should suffice in proving bre-
aches, an approach which does not seem to have been contradicted by 
the Commission’s proposals.
These examples of opposition show that, even though the ECN so 
far has had a largely unifying effect on the discourse of competition po-
licy, things could change. But some of the leading NCAs which have so 
far been vocal in their objections might find themselves overwhelmed by 
many other NCAs whose experience in implementing competition law has 
primarily been guided by the Commission. For example, the Member Sta-
tes that joined the Union in 2004, along with likely future members, have 
largely implemented competition rules in order to comply with accession 
requirements – a discourse that has been completely dominated by the 
Commission. 
It is hard to predict what this means for the future of competition 
regulation in the EU. One could speculate that, once the NCAs have gai-
ned more experience, there could be more pressure towards changing the 
Community’s policy. The ECN could then be used as a more even-footed 
forum for mutual learning and for the reformulation of policies. So far, 
however, the system seems to be having a unifying effect and is being 
largely guided by the Commission.
4.2. The challenge: transparency and accountability
One challenge which will probably have to be addressed in the near 
future is the worrying lack of transparency and legal accountability of the 
ECN’s work, both in the enforcement sphere and in the policy planning 
sphere.
The increased use of soft law, as well as the informal nature of deci-
sions within the network, when dealing with specific cases, is problema-
tic from the aspect of the judicial protection of the affected undertakings: 
‘it is not impossible for example to demonstrate that a decision of the 
Commission to refer a case to a national competition authority is liable to 
affect the rights of parties’.120
Thus, even though the network makes enforcement more efficient 
by subjecting cases to more flexible discussion among the NCAs, there 
are inevitably serious due process issues. Is it really inconceivable that 
the informal, confidential back-and-forth process within the network can 
adversely affect the rights of undertakings, especially their right to be he-
119 See Conseil de la Concurrence, 2005 Activity Report 59-61.
120 Laura Parret, ‘Judicial Protection after Modernisation of Competition Law’ (2005) 32 
Legal Issues of European Integration 339, 359.
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ard? To mention one striking example, the parties cannot access Commi-
ssion communications reported back to the NCAs after they submit their 
envisaged decisions.121 So far, however, the informal communication wit-
hin the ECN continues to be shrouded in mystery and is, as it seems, not 
subject to review before the European courts.122 
Concerns regarding transparency in the policy-making stage are 
perhaps not as acute, but could also become a systematic problem, es-
pecially as the discussion begins to affect increasingly wide matters of 
policy. At the most basic level, the contrast between the amount of infor-
mation available from DG Comp, and even from most of the NCAs, and 
what can be found on the ECN’s own website, is stark. One has to delve 
into the NCAs’ annual reports to find any mention, for example, of the 
ECN’s working groups, let alone to learn what is being discussed within 
them and what the positions of individual NCAs are. It seems that all the 
participants in the network prefer informal, non-public modes of commu-
nication.123 
5. Conclusion
Through regulatory decentralisation, the ECN has in fact achieved 
convergence, both in the sphere of enforcement and in the sphere of po-
licy. The NCAs have been loyal and active participants in the network, 
complying with the Regulation and the Notice, following the rules on co-
operation, the provision of information and allocation of competences. 
There have been no reported cases of jurisdictional conflicts, and the 
Commission has so far not used its power of removal. This paper has 
attempted to show that the modernised system has indeed led to greater 
convergence, and to identify some reasons for such a development. 
The ECN’s unifying impact can be seen from most of the available 
reports, both of the Commission and of the NCAs, as well as from the sta-
tistics showing that the burden of enforcement has indeed largely shifted 
to the NCAs.124 The NCAs report participating actively in the ECN’s policy 
fora, as well as engaging their counterparts in a flexible and effective 
system of case management and resolution.
121 Cengiz, ‘European Competition Network’ (n 8) 18.
122 See Cengiz (n 46) 24-25, and the case law cited in n 96.
123 Cengiz (n 46) 24-25.
124 As an illustrative example, in 2004 the Network was notified of 101 Commission inve-
stigations and 211 NCA investigations. Between 1 January 2010 and 31 October 2010, the 
figures were only 11 for the Commission and 123 for NCAs.  See <http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/ecn/statistics.html> accessed on 7 December 2010.
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The reasons can be traced back to the technical, expert-driven na-
ture of competition law. The assertion of the Commission as the centre 
of European competition policy was created within an epistemic commu-
nity of regulators, judges, scholars and practitioners. The Commission 
has continued to act as the agenda-setter and has been successful in 
pushing through most of its suggested reforms. This has fed back into re-
forms of national competition laws going beyond the requirements of the 
supremacy of EC law, mirroring European developments in the national 
setting. The NCAs seem to be playing out their allegiance to the ‘epistemic 
community’ rather than being dominated by the political arena of their 
own state.
Much of this, however, can change as more of the NCAs develop 
their own particular approaches and become more assertive within the 
ECN. This is the risk posed by decentralisation.125 In the short run, peer 
pressure can dampen the impact of dissent; in the long run, that may 
no longer be the case. This scenario would provide a real test for a full-
fledged regulatory network between equals. We will have to wait until 
then to see if the ‘dispersal of decision-making responsibilities’ can truly 
‘help realize one of the great benefits of diversity in enforcement and ad-
judication – surfacing hard issues for debate and creating dialogue as to 
what the law is and should be’.126
125 Wilks (n 6) 447.
126 Fox (n 23) 143.
